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## Table of Contents

Family Law .....	2
Real Estate .....	5
Employment Law .....	6
Firm Briefs .....	7
KPC In Action .....	8

## We're Moving

**T**he attorneys and staff of Knapp, Petersen & Clarke are pleased to announce that we are moving but are staying in Glendale, California. As of November 3, 2008, the firm will be located at **550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 1500, Glendale, CA 91203**. If you think the new address looks similar to our current address, you're not far off—because we're moving from 500 North Brand Boulevard to the building “next door.”

It was 1990 when the firm last moved from Universal City to Glendale. That same year *Home Alone* was the top grossing film, a first-class stamp cost 25 cents, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act, Germany was reunited, Nelson Mandela was released from a South African prison, and we were all excited about Microsoft's release of Windows 3.0

Eighteen years later, we once again considered numerous communities and buildings in the Los Angeles area, but decided to remain in Glendale, one of the largest financial centers in California and a city with a very receptive business climate. Knapp, Petersen & Clarke will continue to strive for excellence in client service, focusing on assisting our clients in achieving both their personal and business goals.

As year end approaches and the new year will soon be upon us, please accept our very best wishes for a happy and healthy holiday season!

## FAMILY LAW

### SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE — TIMELY AGAIN


The historical tension between religious and secular law has greatly influenced the evolution of law in western society. Prior to the eleventh century, divinely empowered emperors and kings freely promulgated “new theoretical doctrine and ecclesiastical law.” But in 1075, Pope Gregory VII proclaimed the independence of the Catholic Church and announced the authority of the Church to create a cohesive body of religious law. The kings of Europe reacted by developing competing secular law systems. Marriage, a timely topic today, remained under the jurisdiction of the Church, as marriage was considered a sacrament.<sup>1</sup>

The Lutherans, as part of the Protestant Reformation, which began in 1517, developed the “social model” of marriage, in which marriage was considered a social estate of the earthly kingdom, as opposed to a sacred state of the heavenly kingdom. The state was given jurisdiction over marriage under civil law. This model rejected marriage as a sacrament; marriage was nonetheless regarded as “divinely ordained.”

In Calvinist communities, citizens, magistrates, and the clergy were all seen as being responsible for the function of the covenant and the enforcement of the appurtenant laws creating a mixed jurisdiction over marriage.

King Henry VIII of England formally split with the Catholic Church in 1534 and became the supreme head of the Church of England when Parliament passed the Act of Supremacy. After the Reformation (1533–1540), various Protestant groups developed their own laws, particularly those concerning marriage. The Anglican model of marriage, as it developed between 1540 and 1640, was recognized in much of colonial America and formed the basis for the current marriage laws in the United States. Anglican marriage law was seen as “appointed by God” and merged canon law into the common law under the English monarchy. Thus, marriage existed simultaneously in both secular and religious spheres. Since the Anglican Church was the official church of England, jurisdiction was left to church

courts, which were ultimately overseen by the Crown. Official state control of the institution of marriage was completed with the 1753 Parliamentary Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriage, which sought to end clandestine marriage, a practice used in particular to avoid public banns, licensing fees, taxes, and church consecration of marriages. Lord Harwicke’s Act, as it is better known, required formal licensing, witnesses, and consecration by the Anglican Church.<sup>2</sup>



Gwen Freeman

The new American states retained much of the traditional common law, especially in the field of marriage, but the involvement of religion in marriage was explicitly limited by the First Amendment, which provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

Yet despite the erection of a Constitutional barrier between the secular and religious, when courts have been forced to defend marriage laws, they have continued to cite scripture and canon law.<sup>3</sup>

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*“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”*

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The topic is particularly timely in California because of the California Supreme Court’s recent 4-3 decision in *In re Marriage Cases*, where the Court validated same-gender marriage by defining marriage as “the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one’s choice.” The decision did not turn on freedom of religion, or from religion, but on equal protection. The state failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in the disparate treatment of same-gender couples. But the reaction to this decision, including Proposition 8 on the November ballot, is indisputably religiously driven. Among the organizations backing Proposition 8 are Active Christian Media, Advocates for Faith and Freedom, Agudath Israel of California, Associated Christian Schools International, Bethel Baptist Academy, Brethren in Christ Church,

1. ALAN KEENAN, O.F.M. & JOHN RYAN, F.R.C.S.E., MARRIAGE: A MEDICAL AND SACRAMENTAL STUDY 58 (Sheed and Ward, New York 1955).
2. JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 4 (Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville, Kentucky 1997).
3. Emily Taylor, *Across the Board: The Dismantling of Marriage in Favor of Universal Civil Union Laws*, 28 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 171, 177 (2001). Quoting *Caminetti v. United States*, 242 U.S. 470, 487 (1917) and *Murphy v. Ramsey*, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
4. Randall Blandin, *Baker v. Vermont: The Vermont State Supreme Court Held That Denying Same-Sex Couples The Benefits And Privileges Of Marriage Is Unconstitutional*, 9 Law & Sexuality 349, 372 (2000).

Brigham Young University, and the California Catholic Conference of Bishops (in alphabetical order, and that just gets you to the “Cs”). The historical tension is alive and well.

In present-day United States, the secular rights that attach to the civil marital contract are numerous. In fact, there are “1,049 protections and responsibilities accorded married people under federal law.”<sup>4</sup> Laws relating to title and survivorship, probate, adoption, health benefits, advance directives, workers’ compensation benefits, and others, are but some of those that are generally included in this quite expansive bundle of rights.

Marriage has sometimes been said to be contractual in nature. In this regard, it has variously been stated that by law, marriage is a contract, and that it is a civil contract, analogous to a partnership agreement, between parties with the capacity to contract for such marriage...[i]t has also been stated that marriage is a three-party contract between [the couple] and the state.<sup>5</sup>

The marital contract is valid under the laws of the states and usually only after a marriage license is granted and the marriage is solemnized.<sup>6</sup> The *Corpus Juris Secundum* states that: “[s]tatutes usually provide that members of the clergy shall be authorized to solemnize marriages.... Unless a statute expressly provides to the contrary, the authority conferred on members of the clergy... is merely permissive and they are not required to do so.”<sup>7</sup> In Texas, the list of persons authorized to conduct a marriage ceremony include Christian ministers or priests, Jewish rabbis, officers of religious organizations that are authorized to conduct marriages by the organization, and justices or judges within the

state.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, in New York, marriage is clearly defined as a civil contract, and can be solemnized by a clergyman, mayor, or judge.<sup>9</sup>

But the collision of “religion” and “freedom of religion” first reached the Supreme Court in the sphere of public education. *Everson v. Board of Education* concerned the use of municipal funds for the transportation of students to and from parochial schools.

Justice Black cited James Madison for the proposition that religion is not in need of the support of the law, that the people who believe are there to support and uphold it, and those who do not are free to do so. Justice Rutledge, writing in dissent, also emphasized the views of Madison: “Madison opposed every form and degree of official relation between religion and civil authority. For him, religion was a wholly private matter beyond the scope of civil power either to restrain or to support.”

In addressing the question as to whether the New Jersey statute was a “law respecting an establishment of religion,” the Court detailed the historical reasoning behind the Establishment Clause and came to the conclusion that:

[T]he “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go or to remain away from church against his will

or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,

**S**kiing touches all areas of the law. Apropos to the church-state divide, your editor observes that in August the federal Ninth Circuit decided en banc a case involving skiing and religion.

The United States Forest Service signed off on a proposal for a private ski resort operating on a government-owned mountain in Arizona to make artificial snow that included treated sewage (including 0.00001% human waste). The mountain is sacred to several American Indian tribes which argued that the use of recycled wastewater would spiritually contaminate the entire mountain and devalue their religious exercises.

In *Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service* the use of artificial snow made from wastewater was found not to violate the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The appellate court reversed its own three-judge panel’s decision which agreed with the tribes. The court found, instead, that as no physical harm would be done—only one percent of the mountain would receive the wastewater and, because the impact on the tribes’ religious ceremonies would be solely subjective, it was not the substantial burden on the tribes’ religion which could, under the Act, halt the use of the wastewater.

5. Mitchell Waldman, *Marriage*, 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage §4 (2005).

6. See, eg. McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Domestic Relations Law, Chapter 14, Article 3 – Solemnization, Proof and Effect of Marriage, §13. Marriage Licenses. McKinney’s DRL §13.

7. 55 C.J.S. Marriage §31 (2005).

8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §2.202 (1997).

9. N.Y. DOM. REL. §10 (1999).

whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation between church and state.”

In *McCollum v. Board of Ed.*, the Court struck down a decision allowing clergy to provide religious instruction within public schools. Religious instruction on school premises was deemed to be a governmental usurpation of the function of religion, in that the school was providing for the religious instruction. As such, the Court deemed the situation to be “beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith.” The Court again stated that the First Amendment is based upon the “premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their

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*“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”*

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lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”

In *Lee v. Weisman*, a parent of a public school student brought suit seeking to have the practice of clergy-led prayer in school graduation ceremonies permanently enjoined. The District Court stated that the “practice of including invocations and benedictions, even non-sectarian ones, in public school graduations creates an identification of governmental power with religious practice, endorses religion...” and as such was in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court opined that “though the First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the government to undertake the task for itself.”

Justice Kennedy wrote: “Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of life’s most significant occasions.”

The same, of course, could be said about marriage. Indeed, as stated in *Loving v. Virginia*, “Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” *Loving* struck down Virginia’s statute forbidding interracial marriage.

Today, the tension between a secular view of government and one that promotes the tenets of a particular religion is very much in the forefront of the November election. Once again, we are reminded, in the words of Ecclesiastes, “. . . *there is nothing new under the sun.*”

**Gwen Freeman**

**Michael D. Carr**

*Ms. Freeman is a Director in the firm’s Insurance Coverage and Appellate Departments. Email: gf@kpclegal.com.*

*Mr. Carr is a recent graduate of Seton Hall School of Law and is interning with the firm while awaiting bar results.*

**F**or all you mystery buffs, Knapp, Petersen & Clarke is pleased to announce the publication of *Crazy Fool Kills Five*, by Gwen Freeman, the second in the Fifi Cutter mystery series, “an entertaining follow-up to 2007’s *Murder...Suicide...Whatever...*” according to Publishers Weekly, applauding the “outrageous humor” and “sharp courtroom details.”

While tailing a run-of-the-mill workers’ compensation scammer, Fifi Cutter, an independent insurance adjuster, becomes ensnared in a scheme to fix a \$60 million wrongful death lawsuit brought by a legendary Chinatown lawyer. Fifi and her deadbeat half brother Bosco are hired to investigate and must race against time as the jury deliberates to thwart a scheme of extortion, kidnapping, and murder.

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Praise for the Fifi Cutter series:

*“Freeman writes with... breezy style... From its first page to its last, the book sparkles with offbeat wit and snappy dialogue.” – Booklist*

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## REAL ESTATE

### COURT TELLS PARTIES WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE

**T**he California Court of Appeal has addressed a sometimes perplexing problem in determining where a boundary line is. In *Claudino v. Pereira*, Alan Claudino owned land (Lot 1) adjoining that of Patricia Pereira (Lot 2) in the rural Campo Seco area of Calaveras County. An 1867 Act of Congress authorized a judge of the county where the land was located to claim, in trust for the occupants, federal public lands settled and occupied as an unincorporated townsite. In 1868, the California legislature enacted implementing legislation which authorized county judges to survey lands which inhabitants of any unincorporated town could claim under the federal act. Any lots or parcels claimed by any person were to be designated on a plat drawn from the survey. The plats, together with the surveyor's field notes, were to be recorded and become a public record. According to the statute, the lot numbers shown on the plat would then provide a sufficient legal description of the parcels shown, "and such plats, field notes and records, and certified copies thereof, shall be prima facie evidence of the contents and correctness thereof..."

The lands now owned by Claudino and Pereira were surveyed in 1870, and the plat and field notes of the survey were recorded. The common boundary line was depicted as a straight line on the plat. In spite of that, the surveyor's field notes recorded with the plat described the common boundary as commencing at a point at the northwest corner "in the gulch" and thence "northwesterly, down said gulch" to the next corner, a point that is also "in the gulch." The plat of the properties showed that the common boundary line was a straight line between them, but the original surveyor's notes from which the map was prepared showed that the boundary line was the meander line<sup>1</sup> of a gulch between the properties.

A dispute arose, and Claudino sued Pereira to establish that their common boundary was the meander line of the gulch, not a straight line between the corners of

the property, as Pereira claimed. Each side had a survey expert who testified to conflicting interpretations of the original survey. Claudino's expert testified that "down the gulch" was a reference to a natural monument which should therefore be followed to establish the boundary. Pereira's expert testified that "down the gulch" was an imprecise reference to a direction, not a boundary, and that the map, which depicted a straight line was the superior reference to the location of the boundary line. Claudino also produced the testimony of a historian who had researched and found that historic boundaries in the area were often marked by stone walls, which in this case, followed the line of the gulch. In addition, she testified that she found an assessment record from 1860 which described the assessed land as being bounded by the gulch, not a line through the gulch.



Steven Ray Garcia

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#### *"northwesterly, down said gulch"*

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The trial court sided with Claudino, finding that the meander line of the gulch established the boundary between two parcels. The judge relied in part on the field notes from the survey, and taking exception, Pereira appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed. First, the court ruled that the description of the common boundary lines was ambiguous due to the conflicting interpretations of the line's location. Second, the Court rejected Pereira's argument that the plat was inviolate in depicting the line's location. The Court discussed a wide range of cases touching on various facets of the problem but came back to the point that the location of the line as described in the documents was vague, so the trial court was justified in relying on extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the documents to determine its location. Perhaps Pereira's strongest argument was that her deed referred to the plat in describing the land conveyed to her, and therefore, the plat should control. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this position, noting that the reference is not adequate under the original Township Acts unless it is read with reference not only the plat but the field notes of the surveyor who drew the plat.

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1. By its nature, water seeks the low point on land, and when it finds that low point in sufficient quantity so as not to completely percolate into the soil, it either pools or flows, depending on the characteristics of the low point. If the water flows, the line it follows is called the meander line. Typically, water flowing through a gulch will not run all year, leaving the meander line of the gulch as evidence that it was there. Given the characteristics of water and its seasonal flow, the meander line is usually not a fixed course but moves within a course or gulch. There is a specific body of law dealing with flowing water of this type (*Keys v. Romley* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 396), and coincidentally, where a boundary line is described as being a meander line, disputes often arise as to the line's location, particularly if the line moves so as to add land to one parcel (called accretion where it occurs through gradual processes and avulsion if it occurs as a result of a sudden event) and remove it from a neighboring parcel.

## EMPLOYMENT LAW

### **BRINKER DECISION PLACES CLASS ACTIONS FOR MEAL AND REST BREAK VIOLATIONS IN DOUBT**

Lost in the Court's discussion is any reference to California's time honored but oft forgotten rules of interpretation of conveyances found in Code of Civil Procedure section 2077, which reads:

The following are the rules for construing the descriptive part of a conveyance of real property, when the construction is doubtful and there are no other sufficient circumstances to determine it:

One—Where there are certain definite and ascertained particulars in the description, the addition of others which are indefinite, unknown, or false, does not frustrate the conveyance, but it is to be construed by the first mentioned particulars.

Two—When permanent and visible or ascertained boundaries or monuments are inconsistent with the measurement, either of lines, angles, or surfaces, the boundaries or monuments are paramount.

Three—Between different measurements which are inconsistent with each other, that of angles is paramount to that of surfaces, and that of lines paramount to both.

Four—When a road, or stream of water not navigable, is the boundary, the rights of the grantor to the middle of the road or the thread of the stream are included in the conveyance, except where the road or thread of the stream is held under another title.

Five—When tide water is the boundary, the rights of the grantor to ordinary high-water mark are included in the conveyance. When a navigable lake, where there is no tide, is the boundary, the rights of the grantor to low-water mark are included in the conveyance.

Six—When the description refers to a map, and that reference is inconsistent with other particulars, it controls them if it appears that the parties acted with reference to the map; otherwise the map is subordinate to other definite and ascertained particulars.

While the Court of Appeal did not refer to this statute, either because the parties did not rely on it or because the Court was referring to the Township Act instead, the Court's decision appears consistent with the language of rules four and six of the statute. *Claudino v. Pereira* is, thus, not as definitive as it could have been, but it does contribute to the legal literature for those who struggle with the oftentimes perplexing issue of determining where to draw the line between two parcels of land.

**Steven Ray Garcia**

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Employers in California have faced an increasing number of wage and hour class actions filed on behalf of their employees. In 2004 class action treatment of such employee actions was assisted by the California Supreme Court's 2004 decision in *Sav-On Drugstores v. Superior Court*. The high court held in that case that trial court determinations on class certification would not, under ordinary circumstances, be disturbed and approved a sizable wage and hour class action.

The California Supreme Court weighed in again on such issues last year in *Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions* finding that the one hour of pay mandated by the wage orders in California for each missed meal break or rest break constituted wages and not a penalty. The ruling had the practical effect of extending the statute of limitations for such class actions to a minimum of three years, instead of the one year which would apply if such payments constituted a penalty.

This year the current wave of meal and rest break class actions was dealt a blow by the appellate court decision in *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*. Brinker operates 137 restaurants in California, including the Chili's Grill and Bar, Romano's Macaroni Grill, and Maggiano's Little Italy chains. Its employees contend that the company does not provide the meal and rest breaks as required by the applicable Industrial Wage Commission Wage Orders.

The wage orders provide that a meal period of at least one half hour must be provided for every five consecutive hours worked. In addition, rest periods of ten minutes must be made available to employees for every four hours or major fraction thereof of work. The wage orders appear to mandate meal breaks, but require only that the employer permit rest periods.

The *Brinker* court held that, as to rest breaks, the employer need only provide, not ensure, that the rest periods are taken. In a break with a previous California appellate court decision in another district (*Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc.*), the *Brinker* court held that employers are not required to ensure that employees take a meal period for every five consecutive hours worked but need only provide the opportunity that

an employee take such a meal break. *Cicairos* had held that employers had a legal obligation to provide meal periods and must pay an hour of wages for each missed meal break. Thus, if *Brinker* is the law, class actions would not be possible for missed rest periods or meal breaks as the determination of whether the missed break was voluntary on the part of the employee would present individual issues that would preclude class treatment.

It is unlikely that the story in *Brinker* has concluded. After a similar previous ruling by the *Brinker* court, the California Supreme Court took the case, but later determined to send it back to the Court of Appeal for its determination. That return resulted in a July 22, 2008, opinion on transfer from the Supreme Court. A petition for hearing with the Supreme Court has now been filed and will be accepted or rejected by the high court sometime this fall.

In light of the Supreme Court's previous interest in class action issues and meal and rest break issues, it appears likely that the California Supreme Court will take the case. Also, the fact that conflicting appellate court decisions exist would make a Supreme Court hearing more likely.

There is a great deal of interest by employers, their counsel, and plaintiffs' class counsel in this state as to what the court's final determination will be.

**André E. Jardini**

*Mr. Jardini is a Director of the firm and practices in the firm's litigation department. Email: aej@kpclegal.com.*

## FIRM BRIEFS

The firm is pleased to announce that **Jeffrey A. Meyers** has joined KPC as an associate. Mr. Meyers received a bachelor of arts degree from the University of California in 1989 and his juris doctor degree from the University of Southern California Law Center in 1994. Mr. Meyers specializes in insurance coverage and bad faith litigation and counsels clients in a wide variety of areas involving both first- and third-party claims.

Also joining the firm is **Hilary M. Goldberg**. Ms. Goldberg received her bachelor of business administration in business management, with a second major in philosophy, from the University of Notre Dame in May 2000. Ms. Goldberg received her juris doctor degree from Loyola University Chicago School of Law

in May 2003. In 2003, Ms. Goldberg began her practice in Chicago, in real estate transactional matters. In 2005, she moved to California and transitioned into real estate related litigation. Ms. Goldberg is now a litigation associate with KPC.

**Edward A. Terzian** has also joined KPC as an associate. Mr. Terzian earned his bachelor's degree from UCLA, where he graduated summa cum laude and earned membership into the Phi Beta Kappa and Golden Key Honor Societies. He was also recognized by the National Society of Collegiate Scholars for his academic achievements. Throughout his time at UCLA, Mr. Terzian assisted in running his family's small business. After graduating from UCLA, Mr. Terzian attended Loyola Law School, where he earned High Honors awards in several classes, including torts and evidence. Mr. Terzian was also on the Dean's List throughout his tenure at Loyola.

Joining the firm as a principal is **Brian P. Neill**. Mr. Neill has a broad range of litigation experience that includes trial and appellate work. He received his bachelor of arts in 1980 from the University of California at Los Angeles and is a 1990 graduate of Western State University College of Law. Mr. Neill is a member of the Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and an alternative dispute resolution neutral for the Los Angeles Superior Court.

Also joining KPC as a principal is **Michael S. Mars**. Mr. Mars graduated from California State University at Northridge with a degree in political science. He obtained his juris doctor degree from the Ventura College of Law and was admitted to the State Bar of California in 1989. He is a principal with the firm. Mr. Mars specializes in the defense of automobile accidents, premises liability, and public entity cases, with an emphasis on suspicious and fraudulent claims. He also has significant experience in the defense of construction defect and mold claims.

**Michael Kem-Thomas** has joined the firm as an associate. Mr. Kem-Thomas graduated from the University of Chicago in 1987 with a bachelor of arts in political science and from Loyola University Chicago School of Law in 1992. He was admitted to the Illinois bar in November 1992 and to the California bar in August 2000. Since becoming a member of the California bar, Mr. Kem-Thomas has practiced in San Francisco and Los Angeles, specializing in the defense of premises liability, automobile accident, and toxic tort actions. During his practice in Chicago, Mr. Kem-Thomas acted as a prosecutor for the City of Chicago.

## KPC IN ACTION

**Steve Pasarow** has tried seven jury trials so far this year, with six to verdict. He has now tried 100 civil jury trials in his career. American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA) has recognized Steve's trial record by advancing him to the rank of Diplomate within ABOTA. Less than 4% of the national ABOTA membership holds this rank (100 or more trials are normally required). Formed in 1957 to protect the right to jury trial and to advance trial advocacy skills, ABOTA is the premier trial organization in the United States for both the plaintiff and the defense bars. Members must have a minimum of 20 civil jury trials taken to verdict. Steve has been a member since 1993.

He also recently became a member of the Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel (FDCC), an organization comprised of approximately 1,100 civil defense attorneys whose membership is selected by invitation. The Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel was founded in 1936 as an international defense organization dedicated to the principles of knowledge, justice and fellowship and the preservation of American civil jury trials.



**Steve Pasarow**

### EDITORIAL BOARD:

K. Stephen Tang and Gwen Freeman, Editors

This report is published by the law firm of Knapp, Petersen & Clarke and addresses items of interest and importance to our clients and friends.

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